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I. INTRODUCTION
It is not uncommon to find parties to a contract seeking to dis-
claim or limit warranties, or limit the remedies which would other-
wise arise from breach of these warranties. There is nothing
inherently objectionable in this where the parties are bargaining on an
equal footing and the contract is the result of a genuine agreement
between them. Thus, it has long been recognized that there should be
freedom to contract between parties of full capacity.
In many cases, however, there will be no semblance of genuine
agreement or of equality of bargaining power between the parties.
Thus, in the take-it-or-leave-it type of transactions that characterize
many modem-day consumer purchases, the consumer is placed in a
very difficult situation. A viable mechanism for promoting equality
and fairplay is therefore needed. According to the Molony
Committee:1
The overriding argument in favour of prohibiting 'contracting-out'
is that it enables well-organised commerce consistently to impose
unfair terms on the consumer and to deny him what the law means
him to have. This benefit is obtained without the consumer know-
* LL.M., Lecturer in Law at the University of Benin, Nigeria. Currently a J.S.D. Can-
didate at the Stanford Law School.
1. The Royal Commission on Consumer Protection [Molony Report], CMD. 1781, No.
435 (1962).
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ing how he is being treated. If a particular consumer is alive to the
position he will find it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to avoid
submitting to the terms of business universally adopted. Because
the percipient customer is in a small minority the trades concerned
can afford to refuse to modify their usual terms at his behest. He
possesses no bargaining power of sufficient weight to compel. This
is the essence of the case for intervention in support of the consum-
ing public. We endorse the soundness of the case and accept the
need to ban 'contracting-out'.
This paper will critically examine the legal position of warranty
disclaimers and limitation of remedy in consumer sales in Nigeria and
the United States. References will be made to developments in other
jurisdictions where appropriate.
II. THE NIGERIAN SITUATION
Section 55 of the Sale of Goods Act 2 provides that:
Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a contract of
sale by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express
agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by
usage, if the usage be such as to bind both parties to the contract.
3
Since the Sale of Goods Act does not discriminate between consumer
and non-consumer sales,4 both consumer and non-consumer buyers
are treated alike. This is a very unfortunate situation given the myr-
iad of problems confronting the Nigerian consumer. Since there is no
special legislation protecting consumers from disclaimer abuse by sell-
ers, the burden is on the courts to apply the existing common law
principles in such a manner so as to ensure that equity and fairplay is
maintained. These common law principles will now be examined.
A. Incorporation
A seller of goods cannot rely on an exemption clause 5 unless he
2. Sale of Goods Act, 1893, §§ 56 & 57 Vicr., ch. 71, a statute of general application,
was made applicable in Nigeria through the Interpretation Act, Cap. 89, §§ 45, Laws of the
Federation and Lagos (1958 rev. ed.).
3. Sale of Goods Act, 1893, §§ 55.
4. Cf. British Unfair Contracts Act, 1977, § 6(2), which renders nugatory, as against a
person dealing as a consumer, attempts to exclude or restrict liability in respect of the implied
warranties contained in sections 13-15 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893.
5. The term "exemption clause" is used in a broad sense to cover clauses relied on by
the seller to disclaim or limit remedies. Unlike the Uniform Commerial Code, the Sale of
Goods Act, 1893, does not specifically provide for limitations of remedies. However, the exclu-
sion or limitation of remedies seem to be provided for in the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, § 55.
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can establish that the clause was incorporated in the sales contract
from which he seeks protection. This requirement of incorporation
will readily be satisifed when the consumer has signed the document
containing the clause. 6 Thus, absent fraud or misrepresentation, a
person is normally bound by the terms of a document he has signed.7
This is so even though he has neither understood nor read it,8 so long
as the document is a contractual document and not a mere receipt.9
Where there is no signed contractual document, exemption
clauses may still be incorporated into the contract provided that the
purchaser has received reasonable notice. The sufficiency of notice
will depend on a number of factors. Thus, it may be necessary to
consider the nature of the document which contains the clause, the
size and intensity of the print, 10 and the type of damage or loss against
which protection is sought."1 The exclusion of liability for personal
injury would often need to be more explicit than in cases of property
damage. 12
Commenting on the question of notice in Olley v. Marlborough
Court Ltd. ,13 Lord Denning said:
Now people who rely on a contract to exempt themselves from
... liability must prove that contract strictly. Not only must the
terms of the contract be clearly proved, but also the intention to
create legal relations. . . . The best way of proving it is by a writ-
ten document signed by the party to be bound. Another way is by
handing him before or at the time of the contract a written notice
specifying its terms and making it clear to him that the contract is
on those terms. A prominent public notice which is plain for him
to see when he makes the contract or an express oral stipulation
would, no doubt, have the same effect. But nothing short of these
three ways will suffice. 14
The factor of notice was also in issue in the case of Odeniyi v.
6. L'Estrange v. F. Graucob, Ltd., [1934] 2 K.B. 394, 403.
7. Id.
8. Id. See also, Chagoury v. Adebayo, [1973] 3 U.I.L.R. 532, 535.
9. Chapelton v. Barry, Urban Dist. Council, [1942] 1 K.B. 532, 538-539.
10. Cf UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(2) (1978) (requiring the warranty dis-
claimer to be conspicuous).
11. See e.g., Thorton v. Shoe Lane Parking Ltd., [1971] 1 All E.R. 686, 689-90 (Lord
Denning, M.R.).
12. Id at 692 (Miglaw, L.J.).
13. [1949] 1 K.B. 532.
14. Id at 549.
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Zard & Co. Ltd..15 The plaintiff sued for damages for non-delivery of
goods. The defendants contended that they had discovered an error
in the selling price of the goods after payment had been made by the
plaintiff, and as such they were entitled to withhold delivery and to
ask the plaintiff to elect between receiving back the money paid or re-
negotiating for the purchase of the goods at the discovered price.
They also contended that the letters "E and OE" - the abbreviation
for errors and omissions excepted - printed on the receipt issued to
the plaintiff were sufficient notice that the goods were sold subject to
conditions. The court held that the letters "E and OE" were incapa-
ble of putting anyone on notice either of its meaning, or that it consti-
tutes a condition of the contract between the parties. If wisely used,
the requirement of notice may to some extent serve as a check on
sellers who use exemption clauses as a "booby trap" for the unwary
consumer.
The court may infer notice from previous dealings between the
parties. Where there is a consistent course of prior dealings, the pres-
ent contract may be viewed as having been concluded on the same
terms even though notice has not been given afresh. 16 However, Lord
Devlin stated that "[p]revious dealings are relevant only if they prove
knowledge of the terms, actual and not constructive, and assent to
them."' 7 It is true that "[i]f a term is not expressed in a contract,
there is only one other way in which it can come into it and that is by
implication. No implication can be made against a party of a term
which was unknown to him." 8 Since exemption clauses are meant to
curtail the remedies which would otherwise be available to the con-
sumer, it is only fair that the consumer should be fully aware of such
a clause.
B. The Contra Proferentem Rule
As noted above, there is no legislation protecting consumers
from disclaimer abuse by sellers, but the courts are quite determined
to use existing common law principles to restrict the scope of exemp-
tion clauses. Thus, where an exemption clause is taken to have been
incorporated into the contract, it will be construed contra profer-
15. [1972] 2 U.I.L.R. 34, reprinted in SAGAY, A CASEBOOK ON THE NIGERIAN LAW OF
CONTRACT, PROFESSIONAL BooKs 165 (1983).
16. This is specifically provided for in the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, § 55. See Henry
Kendall & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons, Ltd., 1969 2 A.C. 31.




entem. The clause is given the narrowest possible scope consistent
with the intention of the parties. All ambiguities will be resolved
against the party seeking to rely on it.
The contra proferentem was applied by the High Court of West-
ern State, 19 in Odeniyi v. Zard & Co. Ltd.,20 where Justice Johnson
stated:
The meaning attributed to the letters E and OE by the defendants
is peculiarly within their own knowledge as the letters are capable
of other meanings besides the ones given. This is not what the law
requires to make such a condition binding. If as in this case a
party to a contract chooses to hide the true meaning of any condi-
tions he intends to bind the other party, he does so at his own peril
and the court will not resolve any obscure or ambiguous term in
favor of the defaulting party. 21
There is manifest good sense in construing an exemption clause con-
tra proferentem. As the seller seeks to protect himself against liability
to which he would otherwise be subject, the burden is on him to prove
that his words clearly and aptly describe the contingency that has in
fact arisen.
C. Fundamental Breach
Although the contra proferentem rule can be used as a check on
disclaimer abuse by sellers, its demands can easily be met by the use of
an appropriate formula, the wording of which should not pose any
real problem for the modern draftsman. It is therefore not uncom-
mon to find widely drafted exemption clauses that are capable of cov-
ering any contingency that may arise. Absent legislative control on
the use of exemption clauses, the courts responded by developing the
doctrine of fundamental breach. The essential feature of this develop-
ment was that even the most broadly drafted exemption clause came
to be read with the understanding that it did not affect the central
obligations of the contract.
The court held in Suisse Atlantique Societe' d'Armement Mari-
time S.A. v. N. V Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale:
There is no magic in the words 'fundamental breach'; this expres-
sion is no more than a convenient shorthand expression for saying
that a particular breach or breaches of contract by one party is or
19. Western State is now known as OYO State, Western Nigeria.
20. See supra, note 15.
21. Odeniyi, [1972] 2 U.I.L.R. at 38.
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are such as to go to the root of the contract which entitles the other
party to treat such breach or breaches as a repudiation of the whole
contract.2
2
There has been much controversy surrounding the true effect of a
fundamental breach on an exemption clause.23 There are two conflict-
ing propositions: (1) that by a rule of law no exemption clause may
operate to protect a party who is in fundamental breach of his con-
tract; and (2) that the question is not one of substantive law but de-
pends upon the interpretation of the individual contract before the
court. The question, therefore, is which proposition should apply.
Traditionally, it was recognized that where there is a breach that
goes "to the root of the contract, ' 24 any exemption clause will be void
and the party in breach cannot rely on it to escape liability. This
principle was often treated and referred to as a rule of law and was
applicable to the contract irrespective of the intention of the parties as
expressed in the contract. 25 But in Suisse Atlantique, the House of
Lords held inter alia that it is a question of construction in each case
whether the exemption clause applies to the particular breach which
has occurred, and that there is no absolute rule of law that an exemp-
tion clause cannot protect a party from liability for a breach of con-
tract, whatever the gravity of the breach. 26 The Suisse Atlantique
decision was not followed in all subsequent cases. In Harbutt's "Plas-
ticine" Ltd. v. Wayne Tank & Pump Co.,27 Lord Denning said that an
innocent party faced with a fundamental breach of contract:
Is entitled to sue for damages for the breach and the guilty party
cannot rely on the exclusion or limitation clause: for the simple
reason that he, by his own breach, has brought the contract to an
end; with the result that he cannot rely on the clause to exempt or
22. 1967 1 A.C. 361, 421-22. It should be noted that not all breaches of warranties can
be treated as "fundamental" in the sense referred to by Lord Upjohn. But there is no clear
dividing line between those which can and which cannot. Thus, an otherwise minor breach
may become fundamental if the consequences which flow from it are sufficiently grave as to
strike at the root of the bargain. See Harbutt's "Plasticine" Ltd. v. Wayne Tank & Pump Co.,
[1970] 1 Q.B. 447, 466.
23. See Coote, The Effect of Discharge by Breach on Exception Clauses, 1970 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 221.
24. See supra, note 22. A breach that goes to the root of a contract is a "fundamental
breach."
25. See Alexander v. Railway Executive, [1951] 2 K.B. 882; Karsales Ltd. v. Wallis,
(1956] 1 W.L.R. 936; Spurling v. Bradshaw, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 461; Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd. v.
Rambler Cycle Co. Ltd., 1959 1 A.C. 576.
26. 1967 1 A.C. 361.
27. [1970] 1 All E.R. 225, 1 Q.B. 447.
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limit his liability for that breach.28
The House of Lords reversed the decision of the court of appeal
in Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. ,29 and held that
there is no rule of law which prevents a party in fundamental breach
of contract from relying on an exemption clause whose provision is
broad enough to cover the breach. 30 This case therefore affirms Suisse
Atlantique. The House of Lords further re-affirmed this rule of con-
struction view in George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v. Finney Lock
Seeds Ltd. ,3 holding that whether an exemption clause applies to a
fundamental breach or not is a matter of construction of the contract.
Nigerian courts, however, favor the "rule of law" approach.
Thus, if a seller is in fundamental breach of his contract, he cannot
rely on the exemption clauses in the contract.3 2 The case of Etta v.
Udo & Anor,33 is instructive. The plaintiff claimed damages for
breach of an agreement for the purchase of a bread-making machine
from the defendants. She was unwilling to buy the machine origi-
nally, but changed her mind when she was assured of its perfect con-
dition. The machine turned out to be defective. The plaintiff brought
suit for rescission of the contract. The defendants relied on the ex-
emption clauses in the contract. The court, invoking the "rule of
law" approach to fundamental breach, held that the defendants could
not rely on the exemption clause. Justice Koofreh said:
The machine was found and proved to be incapable of producing
bread on the first day of its use. At that stage, the main purpose or
obligation which the contract implied, failed. The law cannot al-
low the defendant to avoid the consequences of that failure how-
ever well-worded [the exemption clause] may be.34
Given the myriad of problems confronting the Nigerian con-
sumer, it is encouraging to note that the Nigerian courts favor the
"rule of law" approach to fundamental breach. This approach is
highly desirable, since there is no legislation in Nigeria protecting
consumers from widely couched or unreasonable exemption clauses.
28. Harbutt's "Plasticine" Ltd, [1970] 1 All E.R. at 234.
29. See Photo Prod. Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd., [1980] 1 All E.R. 556.
30. Id.
31. Reprinted in 131 NEw L.J. 480 (1980).
32. Adel Bashalli, [1961] 1 All N.L.R. 917.
33. [1974] 4 U.I.L.R. 178.
34. Id. at 191; noted in SAGAY, supra note 20.
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III. THE UNITED STATES SITUATION
The law regulating warranty disclaimers in consumers sales is
contained in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)35 and the
Magnuson-Moss Act. 36 The first part of this section will be devoted
to an analysis of the UCC provisions, while the second part will focus
on the Magnuson-Moss Act.
A. The Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code provides two methods under
which a seller may limit his contractual liabilities. First, section 2-316
permits the seller to disclaim or limit his warranties. Second, section
2-719 allows the seller to limit the buyer's remedies for a breach of
warranty. Although the methods are closely related and may lead to
substantially identical effects, they are distinct and therefore require
separate consideration. The court in Murray v. Holiday Rambler,
Inc. 37 explained that:
A disclaimer of warranties limits the seller's liability by reducing
the number of circumstances in which the seller will be in breach
of contract; it precludes the existence of a cause of action. A limi-
tation of remedies, on the other hand, restricts the remedies avail-
able to the buyer once the breach is established. 38
The effect of a warranty disclaimer as governed by section 2-316
of the UCC is largely determined by the type of warranty in question.
In the case of an express warranty, the disclaimer is likely to have
little effect. Thus, while section 2-316 does not automatically invali-
date disclaimers of express warranties, it renders ineffective attempted
disclaimers to the extent they are inconsistent with the words or con-
duct creating the express warranty. 39 Thus, a disclaimer cannot over-
ride express warranties that are unambiguous.
"The very idea that a seller may disclaim an express warranty
may seem illogical or dishonest." 4 A seller should not be allowed to
35. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-312 to 2-318 (1972).
36. Magnuson-Moss Warranty--Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 2301-2312 (West 1982) [hereinafter cited as the Magnuson-Moss Act].
37. 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513, 517 (1978). See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-8, at 462 (2nd ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as WHrrE & SUMMERS].
38. Murray, 265 N.W.2d at 517-18. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 37 § 12-11, at
471-72.
39. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 (1977).
40. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 37 § 12-2.
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disavow an express representation of his that by definition "was part
of the basis of the bargain. '41 It is interesting to note that the draft of
the 1952 Code explicitly prohibited a seller from doing this, for sec-
tion 2-316 then provided that "[i]f the agreement creates an express
warranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative. ' '42
It is true that the UCC makes it difficult for the seller to disclaim
an express warranty, but it is equally true that the operation of the
parole evidence rule may substantially reduce the consumer's protec-
tion.43 If the representations upon which the consumer relies took
place before a final writing is prepared, then a clause purporting not
only to disclaim warranties but to act as a merger clause may effec-
tively bar proof of prior representations."
In contrast to the considerable difficulty of disclaiming an ex-
press warranty, disclaimer of implied warranties of merchantability, 45
or of fitness for a particular purpose" may be relatively simple under
section 2-316. The UCC provides the seller with a specific set of re-
quirements governing the presentation of such a disclaimer in the
agreement. 47  To be effective against an implied warranty of
merchantability, a disclaimer must "mention merchantability and in
case of a writing must be conspicuous. ' 4  To exclude an implied war-
ranty of fitness, the disclaimer must be both in writing and conspicu-
ous. 49 Either warranty may also be disclaimed by language that in
common commercial understanding indicates that the buyer is taking
the goods with no implied warranties.
50
41. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313 (1976).
42. Id. § 2-316.
43. See id. § 2-202.
44. See FMC Corp. v. Seal Tape Ltd., 90 Misc. 2d 1043, 396 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1977).
45. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 (1978).
46. Id. § 2-315.
47. Id. § 2-316. The policy underlying this section is not to prohibit or discourage dis-
claimers but simply to "protect the buyer from surprise." Id. at comment 1.
48. Id. § 2-316(2).
49. Id.
50. The drafters indicated that language such as "as is" and "with all faults" would be
sufficient to meet this requirement. Id. § 2-316(3)(a). But the subsection gives the buyer an
opportunity to nullify an "as is" clause by showing that "the circumstances indicate other-
wise." One such circumstance might be the fact that the buyer is an ordinary consumer with-
out knowledge of the consequences of "as is," "with all faults," or "as they stand." See Knipp
v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert denied, 357 So. 2d 188
(Fla.) (finding that because of the language in the statute which said "[u]nless the circum-
stances indicate otherwise," a seller using the words "as is" cannot be automatically absolved
of implied warranties; and that for the "magic words 'as is' to absolve the seller, "both he and
the buyer [must] understand this to be the meaning of the phrase.").
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The meaning of "conspicuousness" is a very crucial issue in cases
challenging the validity of a disclaimer. The UCC defines the term to
mean language so "attention can reasonably be expected to be called
to it." 5  The UCC goes on to provide examples of ways in which a
clause can made sufficiently conspicuous, such as printing it entirely
in capitals or in larger or contrasting type. 52 It should be emphasized,
however, that these examples are not meant to be exhaustive.
Whether a disclaimer is conspicuous is always a question of fact for
the court. 53 It must be further stressed that the disclaimer or limita-
tion of warranty must be made conspicuous; the negative or limiting
aspect of the provision must be reasonably certain to gain the buyer's
attention. Thus, a disclaimer might be ineffective if only the comfort-
ing term "Warranty" is made prominent, though the provisions as a
whole would restrict the consumer's warranty protection.5 4
The UCC provides the seller with a precise set of requirements
governing warranty disclaimers. However, its provisions on modifica-
tion and limitation of remedies set forth no guidelines on what a
clause must say or how it must appear, 55 other than to require that
the clause expressly state that a remedy is exclusive if it is to function
as the sole remedy. 56 The UCC approves of provisions creating reme-
dies "in addition to or in substitution for" those already provided by
Article 2. 57 But in order to ensure "that at least minimum adequate
remedies [are] available"5 8 to buyers, certain limits are imposed on the
51. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(10) (1978).
52. Id. For a case addressing the "conspicuousness" requirement in the context of an
oral disclaimer, see Regan Purchase & Sales. Corp. v. Primavera, 68 Misc. 2d 858, 328
N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) (oral statement by auctioneer that goods are sold "as is,"
that neither repeated nor amplified, did not meet the "conspicuousness" requirement).
53. See UNIFORM COMMERIAL CODE § 1-201(10) (1978).
54. Compare Victor v. Mammana, 101 Misc. 2d 954, 956, 422 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1979) (disclaimer not conspicuous where only warranty appeared in large print and
disclaimer was in small print and borderless) with Basic Adhesives, Inc. v. Robert Matzkin
Co., 101 Misc. 2d 283, 290, 420 N.Y.S.2d 983, 987 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (disclaimer conspicu-
ous where first word was "non-warranty" printed in capitals). It should be emphasized that a
disclaimer meeting the requirements of § 2-316 will still be ineffective if it is not included as
part of the original agreement, as where it appears on an invoice or owner's manual provided
at the time of delivery. See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 37, at 45.
55. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719 (1978).
56. See Id. § 2-719(l)(b). Cf. Sale of Goods Act, 1893, § 55, which also failed to set
forth guidelines concerning warranty disclaimer or limitation of remedy.
57. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(l)(a). The code specifically gives examples of
allowable modifications, such as "limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts." Id.
58. Id § 2-719(1).
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right of the seller to limit or modify remedies.
The first such limitation comes into play only at the time a
breach occurs. Section 2-719(2) provides that "[w]here circumstances
cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose,
remedy may be had as provided in this Act." 59 This subsection is con-
cerned with remedies that fail to achieve their intended purposes be-
cause of unforeseen circumstances arising at the time of the breach.
The subsection is designed to ensure that the consumer obtains the
benefit of his bargain.
The second restriction imposed by the UCC upon the modifica-
tion or limitation of remedies is specifically directed toward those pro-
visions that can be judged at their inception to be inequitable. This is
the concept of unconscionability. Section 2-719(3) provides that
"[c]onsequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limi-
tation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is
prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss
is commercial is not."
6
It must be noted from the outset that the opening words of sec-
tion 2-719(3) explicitly authorize the contractual exclusion of conse-
quential damages. But the section is of great significance in stating
that limitation of consequential damages for personal injury in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable, and only in the
exceptional case is this presumption overcome. 6' It must be empha-
sized that this subsection only avails the consumer where the seller
did not disclaim the warranties. Where the seller validly disclaims
warranties under section 2-316, the provision section of 2-719(3) will
be redundant.
62
One issue which is yet to be resolved is whether or not warranty
59. Id. § 2-719(a). Comment 1 explains that "where an apparently fair and reasonable
clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to deprive either party of the
substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the general remedy provisions of. . .
Article [2]." This is akin to the doctrine of fundamental breach discussed supra notes 2-33 and
accompanying text.
60. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 37, at 472. See also Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 64
N.J. 260, 315 A.2d 16 (1974) (a contractual limitation of damages in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable, and manufacturer's defense that there was no defect in
the tire was irrelevant to the determination of breach of the express warranty).
61. See Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1974).
62. UCC section 2-302 permits a court to refuse to enforce a contract if the contract or
any clause thereof is found to be unconscionable at the time it was made. The court may also
delete the unconscionable result. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-301(1) (1978).
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disclaimers may be subject to scrutiny under the UCC's general un-
conscionability provision in section 2-302.63 Because warranty dis-
claimers are governed by the specific requirements set forth in section
2-316, the question arises whether disclaimers meeting this require-
ment are exempted from scrutiny under section 2-302, which ex-
pressly extends the unconscionability standard to "any clause of the
contract . . . ."64 This is a hotly debated question and as noted
above is as yet unresolved. 65 Some cases, however, generally support
the view that warranty disclaimers must withstand attack under both
UCC sections.
B. The Magnuson-Moss Act
One of the reasons that prompted Congress to enact the
Magnuson-Moss Act 66 in 1975 was to check the ever-increasing cases
of warranty disclaimer abuse by sellers. 67 Unlike the UCC, the Act is
specifically designed to cover consumer sales. The Act, however, does
not revise prior law in the sense that it does not require any warranty
on a "consumer product" 68 to be given. The Act does not prohibit a
seller of consumer products from disclaiming all warranties, including
implied warranties on a "consumer product," where already permit-
ted to do so by state law.69 As a result, unless restricted by state law,
a seller of "consumer products" may entirely disclaim all implied
warranties, consistent with sections 2-314 and 2-316 of the UCC, re-
spectively, so long as no "written warranty" is offered on such
products.
70
63. Id. § 2-302.
64. Id
65. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 37, at 475-81.
66. Magnuson-Moss Act, supra note 36.
67. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 7702. See also Comm. on Commerce, Report on § 356, S. Rep. No. 93-151, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
68. Section 2301(1) defines the term "consumer product" as "any tangible personal prop-
erty which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or
household purposes (including any such property intended to be attached to or installed in any
real property without regard to whether it is so attached or installed)." Magnuson-Moss Act,
supra note 36.
69. "The term 'State law' includes a law of the United States applicable only to the Dis-
trict of Columbia or only to a territory or possession of the United States." Magnuson-Moss
Act, supra note 36, § 2301(15).
70. The existence of a written warranty triggers the operation of § 2301(a)-(b) of the
Magnuson-Moss Act, which prohibits a warrantor from disclaiming implied warranties where
a written warranty is given, but do permit for a "limited warranty" limitation of the duration
of implied warranties to that of any express warranties. Id.
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Where a supplier offers a "full" written warranty, 71 the implied
warranties may not be disclaimed, modified or limited in either scope
or duration. 72 If the supplier merely offers a "limited" written war-
ranty,73 then the duration of implied warranties can be limited to the
duration of the written warranty as long as such limitation is clearly
disclosed on the face of the written warranty and is not
unconscionable.
74
The Act does not give the consumer any great cause to rejoice as
far as disclaimer abuse by sellers is concerned. As noted above, the
Act only applies where the supplier offers a "written warranty," but
he is not compelled to do so. Even if he so decides, he may offer only a
"limited" warranty which enables him to limit the duration of the
implied warranty at least to a reasonable extent. 75 The seller can limit
or exclude liability for consequential damages even in a "full" war-
ranty situation, so long as such limitation or exclusion conspicuously
appears on the face of the warranty.
76
IV. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the above discussion that one common problem
facing consumers in Nigeria and the United States is that of dis-
claimer abuse by sellers. Each nation has attacked this problem from
different angles, but the problem is still prevalent. It is unfortunate
that Nigeria has no special legislation protecting consumers from
widely drafted exemption clauses. The courts, in a bid to check the
excesses of the seller in this regard, continue to apply existing com-
mon law principles which are far from clear. Consumer protection
legislation is long overdue. Nigeria should follow the example of
Great Britain by making it impossible for the seller to disclaim war-
ranties in consumer sales.
77
As noted above, Congress, in a bid to check disclaimer abuse by
sellers in the United States, enacted the Magnuson-Moss Act. The
Act improved somewhat on the UCC, at least where "written" war-
ranties are given by the seller. However, where there are no "written"
71. See id. § 2303(a)(1) for the definition of "full warrranty."
72. Id. § 2304(a)(2).
73. See id. § 2303(a)(2) for the definition of "limited warranty."
74. Id. § 2308(b).
75. Id.
76. Id. § 2304(a)(3).
77. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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warranties, the abuses continue. The best solution is to make it im-
possible for the seller to disclaim warranties in consumer sales.
